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RIMARAS INC., a Utah
Corporation,
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Priority No. 14b
Defendants.
and
ANNA R. FLEISCHMANN,
Defendant-Appellant
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Attorney for Appellant
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Cedar City, UT 84721-0337
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT G. GARLAND and
MARY GARLAND,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs.
FLOYD J. RIGBY, RAY HALL,
R1MARAS, INC., a Utah
Corporation,

Case No. 88070-CA

Defendants,
and

:

ANNA R. FLE1SCHMANN,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
)

County of Iron

ss:

It is hereby certified as follows:
1.

That my name is Patrick II. Fenton; that 1 am an

attorney of good standing with the Utah State Bar and am the
attorney for the Defendant-Appellant in the above-entitled matter.
2.

I further certified that this Petition is presented

in good faith and not for delay or for any other improper purpose.
DATED this

;

-

day of September, 1989.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was tried before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
District Judge, in Garfield County, Utah; the Defendant saw fit
to take appeal from her position.
This matter was appealled to the Utah State Supreme
Court pursuant to statute; it was remanded by the Utah State
Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for appeal purposes.
Plaintiff*s complaint was based upon a claim of adverse possession.
Defendant's claim was based upon a judgment sale and being the
person in line of title and entitled to the property.

The

Plaintiff claimed purchase of another lot and then a verbal change
to the property that this item is about between himself and
people not in the chain of title, to-wit:

Rigby and Hall.

The

Defendant took judgment against the Defendant Rimaras, Inc. in
Iron County, Utah, and had the same filed in the District Court
of Garfield County, Utah, in which the land in question was
situated in July, 1985.

At that time, the Plaintiff established

a lien on all property of Rimaras, Inc.
The Court of Appeals by panel in Cedar City, Utah, heard
this item on the 17th day of August, 1989.

The decision was the

1st day of September, 1989.
At the time of receipt of the decision of the Utah
Court of Appeals, the undersigned was attending the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals Judicial Conference in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and
did not actually become aware of said decision until September 11,
1989.

At such time, he filed a stipulation and a motion for

extension of time to file a Petition for Rehearing.

He has not

been advised of the action of the Utah Court of Appeals on his
motion and is proceeding to prepare and file a Petition

for

Rehearing on the assumption that said motion for extension of
time, where it has been stipulated to by counsel, will be granted.
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL
POINT I
THIS ITEM WAS PLED AND TRIED ON AN ADVERSE
POSSESSION CASE. THE MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOUND THAT THERE WAS NO ADVERSE POSSESSION
BUT THE COURT HAS UPHELD A DECISION BASED
UPON ADVERSE POSSESSION.
In the case of Day v. Steele, 111 Utah 481, 184 P.2d
216, which was also an adverse possession case, upon continued
reading to be against the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals
in this Garland case rather than for it although it was used by
the Utah Court of Appeals to justify its decision.

In the Day

case, the trial court found that there was adverse possession;
the judgment of the trial court was reversed and the rights of
the record holder were endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court.

In

the opinion of the undersigned, the Day v. Steele case is
specifically an endorsement of the position of Miss Fleischmann
who is the successor by virtue of a judgment sale to the rights
of Rimaras, Inc. which was the Corporation that was sold out.
Attention is invited to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law of Judge Tibbs, attachment, Item I of Defendant-AppellantTs
initial Brief, where there was specific findings that there was
adverse possession.

The conclusion of law found by Judge Tibbs

is as follows, "Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the
Court concludes that the Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment
quieting title to said property in favor of Plaintiffs and

against the Defendants Anna R. Fleischmann, Rimaras, Inc., and
Ray Hall."

As part of the same attachment, Judge Tibbs quiets

title in favor of Robert G. Garland and Mary Garland and against
the other Defendants.
The Utah Court of Appeals indicated that this position
could not be maintained.

In its majority opinion, in the Memorandum

Decision, (Not for Publication), filed on September 1, 1989, the
second sentence of the second paragraph commencing on page 2,
which reads, n We agree the trial courtTs order cannot be sustained
uner a theory of adverse possession."

And yet this is the way

the trial court sustained it and was the conclusion of law based
upon the findings of fact.

Judge Tibbs did make such a conclusion

of law; however, before he made it, he made the statement as the
Utah Court of Appeals pointed out in the same paragraph, n You
havenT t even got it under adverse possession.ft

Also, in the

pleadings of the Plaintiffs Garland, in his complaint allege
adverse possession, and there has been no motion to amend.

So

while we say that in Taubert v. Roberts, 747 P.2d 1046, that this
is an action at law, in the second paragraph of page 3 of the
Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, there is a
statement,

!,

Although the trial court's legal basis for quieting

title in the Garlands rested on a theory of equity and fairness,
which, without more, cannot be sustained" found that the theory
cannot be sustained then certainly the judgment should be
reversed.
POINT II
AT THE TIME OF THE AGREEMENT TO CHANGE TO
LOT 128, THE PEOPLE INVOLVED DID NOT HAVE

ANY INTEREST IN LOT 128. THE INTEREST OF
RIMARAS, INC. WAS ACQUIRED THEREAFTER.
UPHOLDING THIS AGREEMENT, UNDER THESE
CONDITIONS, AS AGAINST THE PARTIES THAT
KNEW NOTHING ABOUT IT AND THE SAME BE A
VERBAL AGREEMENT, THIS IS A MISCARRIAGE
OF JUSTICE.
One must look carefully at the dates involved in these
things as to where the rights came from if any.

The Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, dated the 31st day of
October, 1980, attached to both Defendant-Appellant's Brief
and to Plaintiffs-Respondents1 Brief, in and of itself does not
give any rights whatsoever in connection with Lot 128.

As a

result, the verbal agreement testified to by Mr. Garland became
quite important.

This is shown by Exhibits #2 and #3, which are

included in Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief, Exhibit #3 being
included as an attachment in Defendant-Appellant's Brief, with
the date thereof being very, very important.

Exhibit #3 is a

deed from Rigby and Hall to Lot 128, dated the 20th day of
January, 1981, notarized on that date.

Exhibit #2 is a letter

of transmittal from Hall to Mr. Garland, dated the 20th day of
January, 1981, transmitting a copy of that date, indicated that
the original was being recorded.

If it had been recorded on that

date, it would have conveyed nothing.

Mr. Garland testified

that it was never recorded and that it did not show on the
title.

Conversation pertaining to Lot 128 must have taken place

before this date.

As of this date, all Rigby and Rimaras, Inc.

have amounts to no interest in the lot in question.

Mr. Garland

relied upon this deed and assumed that it was recorded after
having received the letter.

See transcript of testimony, page

14, line 3 to page 15, line 6.

Although the deed was from Hall

and Rigby and this was all he expected, he got what he expected
at that time.

Had the deed been recorded, it would not have

changed anything; he still did not have the property.

The only

thing that was promised was a deed from Hall and Rigby.

It was

performed at that time, and there is no later agreement.

There

is some testimony under the direct examination of xMr. Park of his
client, Mr. Garland reveals that any agreement pertaining to the
change had to take place before the delivery of this deed and
letter.

The conversation that Mr. Park attempted to develop

pertaining to when the change took place is found at page 11, line
23, when he asked for testimony pertaining to the direct testimony
of Mr. Garland.

The reliance of Mr. Garland upon the deed from

Hall and Rigby is set forth therein, and the conclusion was that
this conversation had to take place before the 20th of January,
1981, because of the dates on the letter and the deed.

As of

that date, neither Rigby or Hall or Rimaras, Inc. had any interest
whatsoever in the property that is the subject matter of this
lawsuit.

This can be found conclusively upon the examination

by Mr. Park of his client Mr. Garland on page 11, line 23 to
page 12, line 9 of said transcript, which reads as follows,M
MR. PARK:

Q

And did you subsequently have a

question with Mr. Rigby or Mr. Hall about taking a different
lot, rather than lot N o . — I T m sorry—taking a different lot,
taking lot No. 128.
THE COURT:

The question was is if you had a conversa-

tion with them about taking a different lot.
WITNESS:

A.

Yes.

I did.

MR. PARK:
A

Q.

And when was that?

Oh, I don't know the exact date. Somewhere

around this period of time.
Q

Somewhere prior to January 20, 1981?

A

Yes."

Considering these questions, it is a fair conclusion
that this conversation had to take place before the 20th of
January, 1981 or else there is no point in Hall sending the
deed and the letter.

No one knows what happened to the original

of the deed.
ft is most revealing that neither Hall, Rigby or
Rimaras, Inc. had any interest in Lot 128 at that time.
At a later date in the trial, a Mr. Hatch was testifying, and he was accepted by the Court as a title insurance expert.
He was from Security Title Company of Southern Utah; he had
prepared an abstract on this property.

The entry of Exhibits

10 and 11, which were the abstract being exhibit 10 and 11, and
the sheriffTs deed which was made after the abstract, on page
35, line 9 to page 36, line 15, there is discussion of the title
of the property as a matter of record.

It showed that in the

1940s it was in a Mrs. Heline Jensen and then was transferred to
a Mr. and Mrs. Allen.

Apparently, upon the death of Mr. Allen

and a recording of a waiver of lien from the State Tax Commission
upon tiie

riling oJ an affidavit and death certificate on the

14th day of July, 1981, at which time there as a deed to Rimaras,
Inc. from a Mrs. Warwick, wherein she stated that she had formerly
been Mrs. Allen.

It appeared that she was the survivor there.

Mr. Hatch testilied that the only item thereafter that effected
the title was the Sheriff's deed and the filing of the transcript
of judgment in Garfield County District Court in July, 1985.

On

page 36, the Court requested Mr. Hatch to tell him what shape the
title was in so that the Court would not have to read the transcript.

From page 36, line 17 to page 38, line 3, reads as follows:
n

THE COURT:

we're doing it.

Wy don't you just tell me the chain while

Just give me the chain.

MR. FENTON:
THE COURT:

All right, sir.

Run through the chain.
We'll do that.

It's rather difficult for me. I'd just

have to sit and read the whole thing.
MR. FENTON:

Q.

Mr. Hatch, you checked thjs back to

about when, 1940?
A

Yes.

1 think that was when Mz. Jensen originally

acquired it.
Q

An Mrs. Jensen deeded it to Mr. and Mrs. Allen?

A

That's correct.

Q

And Mr. Allen apparently died and Mr. Allen had a

a tax waiver?
A

An affidavit—severence of the joint tenancy.

0

Yes.

A

A waiver of lien from the State Tax Commission and

a certificate, an affidavit filed.
Q

And then, as Mrs. Warwick, the same lady, deeded to

Rimaras—
THE COURT:

Who is Mrs. Warwick?

WITNESS:

A

MR. FENTON:
we get her into it.

She's formerly Mrs. Allen, Your Honor.
She's formerly Mrs. Allen.

That's when

THE COURT:

Ail right.

So Allen deeded it to who?

WITNESS:

A

To Rimaras,

MR. FENTON:

Q

Rimaras.

And what day was that?

A

That was July 14th, 1981.

Q

And there has been no transfer of title from that

day to the presen time, except the Sheriff's Sale; is that
correct?
A

That is correct.

Q

Now, does your information show when the Fleischmann

judgment became of record in Garfield Count?
A

July 8th, 1985.

From this information, we can only conclude that Rimaras
took title to the property on the 14th day of July, 1981, which was
after the deed from Hall, dated the 20th of January, 1981, which
had had it been delivered, conveyed nothing.

It appears that on

the date of the 20th of January, 1981, Rigby and Hall attempted
to make a conveyance.

The contract was completed even though

they had nothing to convey, and Mrs. Warwick apparently owned the
property according to the testimony of Mr. Hatch, and the items
that affected the title record of the property was the filing of
the judgment lien in Garfield County of the Defendant-Appellant
Ms. Fleischmann and the SheriffTs Sale.

It does appear that

in someway there were negotiations later wherein Hall and Rigby
and Mr. Garland and Rimaras, Inc. conveyed, apparently Exhibit #4
attached to Plaintiffs-Respondents' Brief.

Exhibit #15, attached

to Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief showed that at that time
there were negotiations to get the title from Rimaras, Inc. to

Mr. Garland long after the filing of the lien in July, 1985.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS DID RELY UPON ADVERSE
POSSESSION
Not only is the complaint based upon adverse possession,
the conclusion of law of Judge Tibbs recites adverse possession,
and the judgment is in reliance thereon.

Page 60 of the transcript,

line 7, Mr. Park made the statement, M We do have the property,
possession.M

The Court said on the same page, lines 3 and 4,

"Your client's still got the property•"

The Court was speaking

to Mr. Park.
POINT IV
THERE WAS NO POINT IN RIMARAS, INC. IN ANSWERING.
BY THE TIME THIS MATTER WAS TRIED, RIMARASf TIME
FOR REDEMPTION ON THE PROPERTY HAD EXPIRED AND
THE SHERIFF HAD ISSUED THE DEED, WHATEVER INTEREST
RIMARAS HAD WAS GONE. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,
IT WOULD BE RIDICULOUS TO MAKE AN ANSWER AND
PARTICIPATE IN THIS MATTER.
The deeds from Rimaras, Inc. since the time of trial
bring up questions pertaining to good faith.

Rimaras, Inc. did

not answer, and it was represented at the time of trial by counsel
who did not participate in the trial because of bifurcated and
the title item was to be tried first, with the fraud item to be
tried at a later date.
the matter.

In all probability, there was fraud in

If so, Rigby had filed an answer per se and was not

on notice of trial. What the Court asked for was from Rigby.
There was still pending a fraud item as against Rimaras, Inc.,
Hall and Rigby.

This has since been dismissed.

Under those

conditions, there is no question that there has been some trading
done since the trial.

The claim of fraud has been dismissed.

Rimaras, Inc. has furnished a deed post trial.

Post-trial items

should not be considered in an appellate matter of this nature;
they have been considered by the Utah Court of Appeals and are
mentioned in the Memorandum Decision.

Under these conditions, i

is proper to discuss them here.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT THE RECORD TITLE AT
THE DAY OF THE HEARING WAS IN THE NAME OF MISS
FLEISCHMANN AND THAT THE ACTUAL POSSESSION OF
THE PROPERTY WAS IN THE PLAINTIFFS
This shows that the trial courtTs decision was based
upon possession and adverse possession which the Utah Court of
Appeals has held otherwise and has found otherwise, but still
upholds the decision.

There is no question that this is an

equity decision regardless of what the court says.

See page

64, line 12 to line 19 inclusive of the transcript, which reads:
M

The Court further finds and concludes that
judgment should be awarded in for of the
Plaintiff quieting title against Anna R.
Fleischmann. The Court likewise finds to
hold otherwise would in essence so shock
the Court that the idea of giving Mrs.
Fleischmann the parcel of real property
with the cabin on it, the Court in all equity
and fairness just couldn't do it and that is
the basis of the CourtTs decision. So the
Court finds against the Defendant."
Under these conditions, there is no question that
the trial court found its decision based on adverse posession.
The thought of the loss was the justification.

There is no

question that the Utah Court of Appeals has found that there
was not adverse possession and has found exactly as the trial
court for the Plaintiffs-Respondents because of the loss they
were facing.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion from the above and foregoing, it is
concluded that the trial court found adverse possession in the
Plaintiffs-Respondents Garland and found under the Lach v.
Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802, and decided the other way by the
same Judge with a much different fact situation, that specifically
objected to the Kartchern v. State Tax Commission case which he
had failed to follow in the Lach case, being filed at 4 Utah 2d
382, 294 P.2d 790, which agreed with the Kartchern case.

He

made the statement, "While I disagree with this reversal on
the Kartchern case, I think the trial judge was correct.M

This

may be found on page 52, lines 18 and 19 of the transcript of
the trial of this matter.
Taking into consideration, that this matter should
be rgversed and the Sherifffs Sale upheld.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that the above-entitled
Court reconsider this item and reverse the decision of the
trial court and put the title to the subject property in the
name of Anna R. Fleischmann.
DATED this / S

day of September, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,

PATRICK H. FENTON
Attorney for DefendantAppellant

/

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
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